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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Zachary Polk Nelson appeals from his conviction for trafﬁcking in methamphetamine

following a jury

He

trial.

challenges the district court’s denial 0f his motion to suppress

evidence.

Statement

Of The

Facts

The underlying

And Course Of The
facts, as

Proceedings

found by the

district court

following a hearing 0n Nelson’s

suppression motion, are as follows:

On December

28, 2018, the Meridian Police Department received a call

from hotel management. The hotel advised
that they had received complaints from guests about sex and drug activity
involving a woman and several men in room 148 in the hotel. The police were
provided With the license plate numbers of two vehicles associated With the room,
a Ford Explorer and a Chevy truck. Several ofﬁcers were dispatched along with
one with a drug detection dog immediately after the call was received. Ofﬁcer
for service at the Courtyard Marriott

Brandon Esparza was one 0f the ﬁrst ofﬁcers Who responded. Ofﬁcer Esparza
quickly found the

Chevy truck parked

in front

of the

hotel.

He

took a picture 0f it

two men exited the hotel and approached the truck. Ofﬁcer Esparza introduced
himself. Initially, he was alone although other ofﬁcers showed up shortly after his
ﬁrst contact with the defendant. The defendant approached the ofﬁcer and shook
his hand.
Ofﬁcer Esparza asked them if they were staying at the hotel. The
defendant said that they were. Ofﬁcer Esparza asked for ID and the defendant
went towards the driver’s door 0f the truck. The defendant explained that his
wallet was inside. Ofﬁcer Esparza noticed that the defendant was wearing a knife
and asked him for it. The defendant was ﬁddling With his pockets. Ofﬁcer
Esparza explained that they had a call and were checking 0n it. The defendant had
a bulky, purple velvet Crown Royal bag which ﬁlled his entire hand. Ofﬁcer
Esparza asked the defendant to leave the bag While he was getting his
identiﬁcation out of the truck cab. The defendant placed the bag in the bed 0f the
The defendant got his identiﬁcation.
The ofﬁcer continued t0 ask
truck.
questions about Who the men were staying With and got the names of both men.
The man accompanying the defendant told Ofﬁcer Esparza that he “had warrants.”
The defendant got a cigarette and a lighter while Ofﬁcer Esparza relayed the
information 0n the identity 0f the two men. Ofﬁcer Esparza frisked the defendant
after asking and receiving permission. He told the defendant that they had
received a report of illegal activity and were checking it out and would let him go
as

checking

after

into the sun, a little farther

was not

was n0 problem. The defendant was asked to move
from his truck, since the day was cold. The defendant

out if there

it

There were other ofﬁcers present as time passed but they were
not standing near the defendant. Ofﬁcer Esparza continued t0 ask the defendant
restrained.

about his identiﬁcation and conﬁrmed his address.

About six minutes into the
on the scene. At eight minutes, after talking t0 another
ofﬁcer, Ofﬁcer Esparza informed the defendant that the K-9 had alerted. It is after
that announcement that the defendant was placed in handcuffs. He was then more
thoroughly searched and placed in the patrol vehicle.
encounter, a

K-9

arrived

Ofﬁcer Esparza had parked
the

Chevy truck. His

for the truck to leave the

other

his patrol vehicle near

and

t0 the side rear

0f

was deﬁnitely Visible although it was possible
parking spot. While Ofﬁcer Esparza was at the truck,

patrol vehicle

law enforcement ofﬁcers were inside the hotel gathering additional

information.

(R., pp.33-34.)

After the K-9 alerted 0n Nelson’s truck, ofﬁcers searched the

a

“white

crystal

methamphetamine”; a
p.1 1.)

The

state

which

substance,”

“digital scale

was

“later

determined”

Crown Royal bag and found
to

“36.04

be

charged Nelson With trafﬁcking over 28 grams 0f methamphetamine, a felony,

(R.,

t0 suppress evidence.

that the ofﬁcers “illegally seized

(R., p.26.)

He

claimed,

prohibited from leaving.”

(Aug,

p.3.)

Mr. Nelson was in the hotel room

(Id.)

be located, a

Nelson also argued

c0mmitted[,] nor did

it

identify

among

and detained” him because “[t]here was no

prohibit [him] from entering his vehicle nor” to “block [his] vehicle in a

crimes.”

t0

pp.2 1 -22.)

Nelson ﬁled a motion

that

of

with drug reside”; and “several clear plastic baggies.” (PSI,

and with frequenting a place where controlled substances are known
misdemeanor.

grams

manner

other things,

legal basis to

in

which

it

was

Nelson argued the ofﬁcers “had n0 speciﬁc knowledge
at issue”

that “[t]he call

and he did not “appear

was not speciﬁc

to

be committing any

t0 identify actual crimes

being

Mr. Nelson as the individual committing the crimes,” and

that,

“[a]dditionally, the Video clearly

shows” Nelson had “n0 signs of intoxication.”

concluded, the detention “was merely a ﬁshing expedition.”

(Id.)

(1d,)

Following a suppression hearing, in Which Ofﬁcer Esparza testiﬁed, the
issued a written opinion denying Nelson’s motion. (R., pp.33-37.)

was “brieﬂy detained,” but found
There was a
ever drawn.

the detention

was

brief, investigative detention

No

Thus, he

district court

The Court agreed

that

Nelson

proper:

of the defendant.

voices were ever raised.

N0

N0 weapons

sirens or police lights

were
were

Information gained as soon as Ofﬁcer Esparza arrived allowed him t0

activated.

men

determine that he was talking t0 the
activity occurring out

associated With the call about drug

of Room 148. Ofﬁcer Esparza never drew his weapon and

never engaged in any kind 0f threatening behavior.

showed up

Although the other ofﬁcers

as the encounter continued, they did not display

any weapons and did

not even approach the defendant. Although Ofﬁcer Esparza’s vehicle was parked

was near the defendant’s truck, it did not
would have been a little more difﬁcult t0 pull

several feet behind another vehicle and

block the ability t0 exit although
out.

The

entire

Terrym stop

it

lasted six minutes before

it

moved from

a Terry stop

t0 a probable cause arrest.

(R., pp.36-37.)

The court found
abnormally drawn out,
district court

7,

concluded

C6

that

“was a very brief investigative detention”—”[n]othing was

[n]0 voices

it

were

raised,”

and n0 weapons were drawn.

(Id.)

Thus, the

“was the kind of brief, investigative detention contemplated by Terry,”

and denied Nelson’s motion

t0 suppress.

The case proceeded
acquitted

it

of frequenting.

(Id.)

t0 a jury trial,

(R.,

pp.56-57.)

and Nelson was found guilty of trafﬁcking and

The court imposed a sentence 0f

ten years

imprisonment, With three years ﬁxed. (R., p.64.) Nelson timely appealed. (R., pp.67-68.)

1

Tag v. Ohio, 392 U.s.

1

(1968).

m
0n appeal

Nelson

states the issue

Did the

district court err

When

it

as:

denied Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4)

The
Has Nelson

state rephrases the issue as:

failed t0

show

the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
Nelson
A.

Fails

To Show The

District

Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion T0

Suppress Evidence

Introduction

Nelson argues on appeal
unlawfully detained.

should be

He

claims, for the ﬁrst time

as

“treat[ed]

He

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

that the court erroneously denied suppression because

an anonymous

also argues

tip,”

0n appeal,
or

more generally

that the hotel

was otherwise
that

he was

manager’s report

unreliable

evidence.

Ofﬁcer Esparza lacked reasonable,

articulable suspicion to detain him. (Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

Both 0f these arguments
or otherwise unreliable

is

The claim

fail.

that the hotel

legally

“anonymous”

merits.

Likewise, there was

that justiﬁed Nelson’s brief detention. Nelson’s

motion was properly

not preserved, 0r in any event

ample reasonable suspicion

manager was

fails

0n the

denied.

Standard

B.

On

Of Review

review 0f a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial court’s

determination as to Whether constitutional standards have been satisﬁed in light of the facts.
State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State V. Fees, 140 Idaho

81, 84,

90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).

those “[ﬂindings Will not be

If

ﬁndings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

deemed

clearly erroneous.”

State V. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648,

181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State V. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481,

485

(Ct.

App. 2006)).

Was “Anonymous” Or Her Tip Was
Alternatively, They Fail On The Merits

Nelson’s Claims That The Hotel Manager

C.

Unreliable Are

Not Preserved;

Pursuant t0 the Fourth

Amendment of the United

Otherwise

States Constitution “[t]he right 0f the

people t0 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Such a detention

and

seizures, shall not

it is

based upon speciﬁc articulable

been, 0r

is

Which justify suspicion

about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State

P.3d 1220, 1223

M,

facts

App. 2003)

(Ct.

449 U.S. 41

1,

investigatory seizure

V.

that the detained person

1,

determined by the

totality

has

21 (1968); United States V.

417 (1981)). Whether an ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion

is

is,

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88

392 U.S.

(citing Ter_ry V. Ohio,

“is permissible if

of the circumstances.

t0

conduct an

State V. Rawlings, 121

Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992).

The

district court

below properly considered the hotel manager’s

0f the circumstances. Reasonable suspicion
report 0f suspicious activity.”

2000).

may be provided “by an informant’s

336

totality

a citizen’s

(Ct.

App.

Here, the reported suspicious activity was “drug activity and possible prostitution

Room

license plate

numbers of two vehicles associated” With

Ls.16-24.)

Ofﬁcer Esparza himself

148,” and “[m]anagement, in the

337 (ﬁnding the

caller’s “report

initial call,

that

was

provided the description and

room.

“partially corroborated”

responding t0 the hotel and locating Nelson’s vehicle.

at

of the

tip 0r

State V. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334,

occurring in

P.3d

tip as part

that vehicle

(R., p.36); Larson,

partially corroborated

tip

was not

description after

135 Idaho

at 102, 15

by” the ofﬁcer’s “observation

of a driver and vehicle, Which met the description given by the
manager’s

(R., p.36; 4/1/19 Tr., p.7,

caller”).

While the hotel

the only suspicious circumstance that justiﬁed Nelson’s detention (as

explained below), the court properly considered

it

as

one of them.

For the ﬁrst time on appeal, Nelson argues the hotel manager’s

“anonymous,” unreliable

Who made
the hotel

tip,”

tip

because “there

no information

should be deemed an

in this record regarding the guests

the report.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Nelson also contends “there

management

or staff did any investigation of their

which, he claims, means “the

was happening

activity

is

tip

This claim

is

in the hotel

own

t0 corroborate

room.”

not preserved.

4/1/19 T11, p.27, L. 2

because

it

did not

—

Below, Nelson never argued

that the hotel

Instead,

Nelson only noted

criminal activity” relating t0

him

— p.29,

(E Aug, pp.1-5;

below

will not

when he

be considered by

this court

It is

State V. Gonzalez,

issue

2

J11,

was

arrived

on

well-settled that

0n appeal, and the

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (quoting

BV & Through Dep’t

it

L.5.)2

held t0 the theory upon Which the case was presented t0 the lower court.”

State,

was “vague,”

personally, or that

This was insufﬁcient to preserve the claim pressed 0n appeal.
“[i]ssues not raised

manager should

that the call

otherwise contradicted “by the actual observations that Ofﬁcer Esparza” saw
scene. (4/1/19 Tr., p.28, L.24

any aspect 0f the

(Id.)

p.33, L.21.)

“list particular

that

tip lacks speciﬁc, articulable facts that indicate that illegal

be considered “anonymous” or that she was otherwise an unreliable source.

ﬂ

no indication

is

parties will

be

State V. Garcia-

Heckman Ranches,

Inc. V.

of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799-800, 589 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979));

165 Idaho 667, 450 P.3d 315, 320 (Idaho 2019) (“We require ‘both the

and the party’s position 0n the issue

Nelson apparently abandoned

[t0]

be raised before the

his other pre-hearing

trial

court for

claim—that “[t]he

call

it

to

be properly

was not speciﬁc

to

(Aug, p.3.) He did not reassert this claim at the
— p.33, L21), most likely because it is plainly
(ﬂ
contradicted by the record (ﬂ 1/24/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-10 (Where Ofﬁcer Esparza afﬁrmed the
hotel manager’s tip indicated “there was a possible prostitution and drug problem” going on)).
identify actual crimes being committed.”

suppression hearing

4/1/19 Tr., p.28, L.24

m

preserved for appeal.”’); State V. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 445 P.3d 147, 151 (2019);

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“We will not hold that a

making a decision on an
t0 address.

.

..

issue 0r a party’s position

name of

it

did not have the opportunity

a case and a general proposition therefrom

enough

to raise every speciﬁc theory or principle

P.3d

151 (2019) (footnote omitted).

manager’s

that

call

It

of law within

it.”

m,

165 Idaho

at

not

is

342, 445

at

necessarily follows that simply arguing that the hotel

was vague or contradictory—which was

the claim

below—is insufﬁcient

preserve every imaginable challenge t0 the hotel manager’s tip 0n appeal.

P.3d

court erred in

A groomed horse is expected 0n appeal, but a different horse is forbidden”)

Indeed, even “stating the

at

on an issue

trial

ﬂQ

at

to

342, 445

151 (explaining that “a ‘kitchen sink’ strategy will not sufﬁce to preserve an issue for

appeal and

is

inherently unfair”).

Thus, Idaho’s appellate courts “place[] a premium 0n counsel presenting the facts and law

that

it

chooses to support

its

position in the

443 P.3d 23 1, 240 (2019). Where a
issue, the

trial

court.”

“district court

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226,

never had the chance to rule 0n” a particular

proceedings Will naturally “develop[] in such a

way

that” the parties

have “neither the

incentive nor the opportunity to present evidence 0r argument concerning” the unpreserved

theory. State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226,

This case exempliﬁes
hotel manager’s tip should be

to pass

on the question.

manager
PSI,

t0 testify.

p.25

(the

that.

Because Nelson waited

deemed an anonymous,

Moreover, the

Why would it have?

police

443 P.3d 231, 240 (2019).

report

state

The

until appeal t0

unreliable

tip,

make

the court

had no opportunity

had n0 opportunity or incentive

hotel

the claim that the

t0 call the hotel

manager was a known, identiﬁed Witness

containing the hotel manager’s

name and

detailed

information», and n0 one below ever conceived of her as “anonymous,” objected

(ﬂ

contact

when

the

ofﬁcer testiﬁed about her
generally 4/1/19 Tr.)

called, she

On

would have testiﬁed

12-28-2018,

we

appeal,

indeed personally observe

On

0r otherwise attacked the tip

tip,

now

only presume that

if the

Which

indicate she did

some of the suspicious circumstances:

approximately 1529 hours, Ofﬁcers responded t0 1789

Eagle Road (Courtyard

(m

manager would have been

consistent With her statements to police,

at least

at

can

on foundational grounds.

By

S.

Marriott) for a drug and prostitution investigation

happening in room #148.

I spoke with the calling party, Dina Quesnell Ozotel
Manager) by phone who reported one female and ﬁve males were inside of a hotel
room. Dina stated other guests had reported loud sexual noises coming from the
room. Dina stated Talis Oliver O’emale) rented the room and believes drugs are
being used due t0 them looking like “tweekers”. Dina stated Talis drove a Ford
Explorer and one of the males was driving a gray Chevrolet pickup With Idaho
license plate

(PSI, p.31 (emphasis added).)

Similarly,

Nelson never even hinted below

themselves t0 the hotel management or
p.28, L.24

—

p.33, L.21.)

it

mattered whether “the guests identiﬁed

(Compare Appellant’s

staff.”

Had Nelson done

that

the hotel

manager

check in to a

would know

conﬁrm

t0

had n0 opportunity

weigh

hotel, guests

the

names 0f

their stories.

in

to

0n guest identiﬁcation

must

identify themselves,

the guests, their

it.

in light

And

there

was n0

incentive t0 call

0f the default assumptions: that t0

and that—of

people—a

all

hotel

to get ahold

manager

of them t0

Proving up these common—sense presumptions would have been a waste 0f

that these issues mattered,

about them?

T11,

But because Nelson never

room numbers, and how

time unless there was some indicator they were

argument

respond to

with 4/1/19

could have easily called the hotel

so, the state

manager and asked her whether the guests identiﬁed themselves.
raised the issue, the state

brief, p.9

why would

at issue in this case.

So

in the absence

the state have called the hotel

manager

0f some
t0 testify

Allowing Nelson

t0 press these

newfound

legal claims

0n appeal would therefore thwart a

primary aim of issue preservation: giving parties “the opportunity to address and respond” to
issues “at the district court level,”

Idaho

and

at

and develop the factual record appropriately. HLkins, 165

225, 443 P.3d at 239 (emphasis added).

agile counsel at all levels,”

Our

adversarial justice system

and parties develop factual records

actually raised below, not hypothetical arguments that

press 0n appeal.

Li

at

226, 443 P.3d

at

240.

more

that address the

active

Because Nelson waited

m,

tip is

agile attorneys

until

now to advance

Much

are preserved, they fails

stretch

0f the imagination. The police knew

to her after she called in the tip.

L.22 — p.12, L.4.3)

on the

merits.

m

While an

who made

the call, identiﬁed

(4/1/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-25; 1/24/19 Tr., p.11,

The Idaho Court of Appeals has afﬁrmed

that

even Where an unidentiﬁed

“gave her address and thereby made her identity readily ascertainable,” and her report was

“subject t0 immediate conﬁrmation

caller.”

a

these

135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000), the hotel manager here was not

and spoke

caller

might

less did the

“generally not enough” to provide the requisite reasonable suspicion,

“anonymous” by any
her,

arguments

ever rule 0n them. They should not be entertained 0n appeal.

Even assuming Nelson’s claims
anonymous

active

and

claims the state had n0 opportunity or incentive t0 address them below.

district court

“demands

E m,

known

location,

135 Idaho

Who was

by responding

at 102,

police,” such a caller

15 P.3d at 337.

Under

was “not an anonymous

that standard, the hotel

manager,

at

easy t0 ﬁnd, and Whose report was subject t0 immediate

conﬁrmation, was not anonymous.

3

The preliminary hearing transcript was admitted into the suppression hearing evidence 0n
Nelson’s motion, to “establish Ofﬁcer Esparza’s prior testimony but for n0 other purpose.”
(4/1/19 Tr., p.27, L.8

— p28, L23.)

10

Moreover, Nelson

fails t0

manager’s report was based,

this

at least in part,

cited authority demonstrates that.

(2009), the Idaho

show

conclusion would be different simply because the

on the complaints of hotel

Nelson’s

guests.

In State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 813, 203 P.3d 1203, 1212

Supreme Court squarely

rejected the claim “that a citizen-informant’s tip

The Court

should be reclassiﬁed as anonymous based solely on his or her basis of knowledge.”

found that “the

fact that” a citizen—informant’s “tip

was based on a

carnival workers does not transform his report into an

“no authority” supporting such a theory.
workers

9“ identities were

Li.

anonymous

Beyond

that, the

were trying

tip,” in part

When

P.3d

at

record revealed the

workers’ report

unnamed

was “n0 evidence

it is

citizen-informant’s tip

that “[a]

may

based 0n a third party’s observation 0f illegal

was

give rise t0 reasonable

activity.” Li. at 814,

possessed adequate indicia of reliability”:

Kelley t0 locate Bishop and provide Miller with a running report of Bishop’s

There

identities or

is

n0 evidence

were providing

workers were trying to conceal their
information. Instead, the workers’ decision t0

that the

false

report the incident directly t0 a city ofﬁcial suggests that the opposite

Moreover, Kelley put enough
police.

The

fact that

fact that

trust in the

workers’ allegations to report

Kelley considered the report reliable

he decided to follow Bishop

until Miller arrived.

is

is true.
it

also evidenced

Based 0n the

to the

by

the

totality

of

these circumstances, Chief Miller had reasonable suspicion t0 stop Bishop in

order t0 investigate the allegations 0f criminal activity. Because the stop

was

could not have tainted the subsequent discovery of methamphetamine
justiﬁed,
and we need not decide Whether Bishop’s arrest was an intervening circumstance
it

that

purged the

taint

of an

203

the informant’s tip reliable, but the underlying “carnival

The report was based 0n an alleged crime that the workers personally observed.
The workers were able t0 provide a speciﬁc description 0f Bishop, Which allowed
location.

that

t0 conceal their identities.” Li.

There, not only

1213.

because there was

readily ascertainable” because the informant “provided police with

The Court concluded
suspicion even

two unnamed

report from

sufﬁcient information to trace” them, which they eventually did, and there
the workers

own

illegal stop.
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Li. at 815,

203 P.3d

Nearly

were trying

all

at

1214.

of those factors are present here.

There

is

no evidence

that the hotel guests

The

guests’ decisions t0

t0 conceal their identities or provide false information.

report their suspicions to the manager, as well as the fact that multiple guests decided t0 d0 so,

The

indicates the opposite.

hotel

and therefore thought they were

manager put enough stock
reliable too.

in the allegations t0 call the police,

Finally, While there is

no

direct evidence in the

record regarding the guests’ identities (in large part because Nelson never raised these issues
below), the common-sense conclusion

information from the hotel manager.

guests—a

feat

is

that

law enforcement could have gathered guest

A hotel manager would know Where t0 ﬁnd her own hotel’s

presumably easier than tracking down the unnamed carnival workers in

m,

given the itinerant nature of carnival work.
Thus, under
considered

assuming

among

this

m,

the hotel manager’s report

argument

is

preserved, Nelson fails to

Nelson argues more generally
satisfy the Terry standard for seizing

to

show

It

was properly

the suspicious circumstances justifying Nelson’s brief detention.

Law Enforcement Had Ample Reasonable

D.

was not anonymous.

Even

show any error.

Suspicion

that the totality

To

Justify Nelson’s Brief Detention

of the suspicious circumstances did “not

an individual.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.6.)

Here, too, he

fails

error.

Nelson was properly detained When Ofﬁcer Esparza told him not
(4/1/19 TL, p.16, L.21

— p.17,

L.4.) Citing State V. Perez,

t0 get into his truck.

164 Idaho 626, 629, 434 P.3d 801, 804

(2019), the district court correctly noted that “[a] call to police dispatch containing sufﬁcient

detail

coupled with an ofﬁcer’s observations can provide a sufﬁcient basis for an ofﬁcer t0

12

conduct a Terry stop.”

(R., p.36.)

The

call here,

“from the Courtyard Marriott’s management,”

described “drug activity and possible prostitution occurring in

Room

Ofﬁcer Esparza arrived 0n scene he corroborated a portion of
truck—”the one associated With
corroborating the

tip.

(Id.)

Room

148.”

And Nelson was

A
had

some type 0f contraband

carrying a

alerted.

(R., pp.36-37.)

carried out in a

manner

This was

all

which justiﬁed the interference

a “bulge” in

in the ﬁrst place.”

it

was “usually normally one of two

weapon”

(4/1/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-7).

later,

proper, insofar as an investigative detention

the

K—9

must “be

scope and duration t0 the circumstances

State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181,

Given the

926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
the tip from hotel

there,” further

Nelson ensued; around eight minutes

that is reasonably related in

When

by ﬁnding Nelson’s

Crown Royal bag with

0r possibly even a

“brief, investigative detention 0f”

that tip

(R., p.36.)

Nelson “admitted staying

(Id.)

(1/24/19 T11, p.14, L.3-9), Which, in the ofﬁcer’s experience,

things”: “either

148.”

totality

90 P.3d

of the circumstances, including

management—parts of which Ofﬁcer Esparza himself corroborated—the

ofﬁcers had ample reasonable suspicion to effect a brief, narrowly tailored detention in order to
investigate the reported drug

Li.

Thus, the

and prostitution

district court correctly

detention,” with nothing “abnormally

detention contemplated

by Terry.”

Nelson argues 0n appeal

room” should be completely

activity

and Nelson’s possible involvement

out,”

it.

was a very

brief investigative

and exactly the “kind of

brief, investigative

concluded that

dawn

in

“[t]his

(R., p.37.)

that “the complaint about ‘sexual noises’

disregarded,

articulable suspicion that a crime has

because

it

been committed.”

coming from the

does not “contribute t0 reasonable,
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

Per Nelson,

even “Ofﬁcer Esparza acknowledged that the sex noises from the room did not indicate that a
crime was being committed.” (Appellant’s

brief, pp.1,

13

6 (emphasis added).) But that

is

not what

When

the ofﬁcer testiﬁed.

asked, the ofﬁcer admitted one undeniable point—that “[i]n terms of

the loud sex noises, there’s n0 speciﬁc crime that wouldprohibit that.”

(4/1/19 Tr., p.19, LS.8-

11 (emphasis added).)

This

is

obviously true; noisy sex

is

not a crime. But that’s beside the point. Just because

a particular behavior might itself be legal, or potentially have innocent explanations, does not

mean

it

should be ignored as a suspicious circumstance.

that “a police ofﬁcer

may

in appropriate circumstances

E m,

and

in

392 U.S.

at

an appropriate manner approach a

person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there
cause to

(holding

make an
“the

ﬂ

arrest”)

also State V.

22-23 (ﬁnding

Dannev, 153 Idaho 405, 41

1,

is

no probable

283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012)

of alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate

existence

reasonable suspicion”). The ofﬁcers here were responding to a tip “describing drug activity and

possible prostitution.”

question

hotel

is

room

place.

(R., p.36;

1/24/19 Tr., p.6, L.24

not Whether cacophonous copulation

—

So, the

p.7, L.1; p.17, Ls.8-11.)

is illegal; it’s

Whether loud sex noises from a

contribute t0 a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the crime 0f prostitution

is

taking

Which, of course, they d0.
Primarily relying on his claim that the hotel manager tip

was

unreliable,

Nelson also

argues that the ofﬁcer “had n0 ‘speciﬁc, articulable facts’ regarding any potential crime in the
hotel room.”

preserved,

Room

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

it fails.

148 was a

circumstances.

The

hotel manager’s tip that drug use and prostitution

reliable,

m,

But, as demonstrated above, even if this claim

was taking place

is

in

speciﬁc fact that was appropriately considered as part 0f the suspicious

164 Idaho

at

629, 434 P.3d at 804. That

tip,

plus the other circumstances

the ofﬁcers observed, justiﬁed Nelson’s brief detention While the ofﬁcers investigated the

reported drug use and prostitution. Considering the totality 0f the circumstances, Nelson

14

fails to

show

the district court erred in determining he

was properly

detained.

The court properly denied

suppression.

CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectﬁllly requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

of Nelson’s

t0 suppress evidence.

DATED this 8th day 0f October, 2020.
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